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This article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-
revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by 
intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix 
both motives. The laboratory experiments indicate considerable heterogeneity of motives. 
A majority of subjects seem to combine both motives. However, the composition of the 
mix is subject to a transition, which can be formalized by the principle of appropriateness. 
In contrast to contemporary reciprocity models, this approach suggests that mildly unkind 
treatments are responded mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh 
reactions.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, there has been substantial progress with respect to an economic 
theory of fairness. Considerable evidence indicates the importance of fairness for 
economic behavior. Subjects cooperate in social dilemma games, they contribute to 
voluntary public goods, and they are willing to sacrifice payoffs of their own in order to 
change those of others. It seems that people draw utility not only from their own payoffs, 
but also from the well-being of others (see, e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). Yet, there is an 
ongoing debate about the motives that trigger fairness (see, e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2005). Among others, the contemporary literature indicates two major motives; first, 
distributional motives (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) and, second, 
intention-based motives (e.g., Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004, Sobel, 2005, 
Falk & Fischbacher, 2006, Cox, Friedman & Gjerstad, 2007).1 
 
This article reports experiments on a simple ultimatum bargaining game that allows me to 
differentiate players according to their types of fairness motives (i.e., distributional type 
players, intentional type players, and mixed type players). I will analyze whether players’ 
choices indicate consistently one type of fairness motives across several distribution 
decisions. Notice that even models that nests distributional and intention-based 
preferences (e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002) predict a consistent mix of both motives for 
players’ choices. For those players whose choices violate consistency, one may ask 
                                                 
1 There is a similar approach to intention-based preferences, guilt aversion (Batigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007), 
relying on the idea that subjects dislike letting down the opponents’ expectations concerning responses. As 
this model leads to qualitatively similar predictions, I will not explicitly discuss guilt aversion hereafter. 3 
whether there is a principle for the transition between motives for different tasks. I will 
offer such a simple principle formalizing the transition, the principle of appropriateness. 
This principle of appropriateness will identify tasks for which it is appropriate for the 
player to respond inequity averse (distributional motive) or reciprocal (intention-based 
motive), respectively. Individual differences in appropriateness will be captured by an 
individual taste parameter. I will show that for extreme values of the taste parameter, the 
principle of appropriateness nests the two predominant fairness motives. Purely inequity-
averse players exhibit a zero-taste parameter and adhere to equality irrespectively of the 
distribution task, whereas purely reciprocal players hold a sufficiently large parameter so 
that they prefer a large inequality in payoffs. However, in contrast to intention-based and 
distributional preference models, subjects do not per se prefer extreme or equal payoff 
distributions. 
 
I will denote the game that allows us to distinguish between fairness motives as the 
ultimatum-revenge game. The ultimatum-revenge game partly corresponds to the 
standard two-person ultimatum game. One person, called the proposer, receives an 
endowment P. The proposer has to offer the second person, called the responder, a share x 
of P. If the responder accepts the offer, the proposer receives the payoff P – x, while the 
responder earns the offer x. However, the game differs substantially from the standard 
ultimatum game if the responder rejects the offer x. Rejecting the offer, the responder 
earns κx for a exogenously fixed factor 0 ≤ κ < 1, but freely determines the payoff for the 
proposer, y, from an interval y ∈ [0, P–κx] (the “revenge”). Assuming pure material self-4 
interest, there are several subgame perfect equilibria of the  ultimatum-revenge game, 
where the resulting payoffs for responder and proposer do not differ from that of the 
standard ultimatum game. The smallest positive x will be offered and never be rejected. If, 
however, responders reject offers, they reveal a taste for fairness. Rejecting offers, 
inequity averse responders choose equitable payoffs for the proposers (i.e., y = κx). 
Reciprocal responders will choose proposers' payoffs from the lower bound of the interval 
(i.e., y = 0) rejecting unkind offers. Responders who choose y between the two points (i.e., 
y ∈ (0, κx)) indicate a mix of both motives. The crucial question is whether responders 
choose y consistently when rejecting several offers. That is, if responders reject more than 
once, do all their responses, for instance, indicate inequity aversion? Distributional, 
intention-based and mixed models suggest so. However, for a certain taste parameters, the 
principle of appropriateness predicts a variation in y. For rejections of very unequal offers, 
it is appropriate to choose y that indicates reciprocity, while for only mildly unequal, but 
still unacceptable offers, appropriateness suggests to choose y = κx.  
 
There is a broad body of experimental literature on the relation between distributional 
preferences and intention-based preferences. For instance, the results of the mini-
ultimatum game2 experiments by Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) demonstrate the 
importance of both motives for fairness. When the proposer has the option to offer an 
equal distribution of earnings and an unequal one favoring herself, the responder rejects 
                                                 
2 The mini-ultimatum game has two stages, where a constant sum is distributed between two persons. In the 
first stage, a proposer has to choose a particular distribution. In the second stage, the responder is asked to 
accept the payoff distribution. When she rejects it, both payoffs are zero. 5 
significantly more often the latter one than when the proposer has to choose between the 
unequal and an even more unequal distribution of earnings (44.4% versus 8.9%). Of 
course, this result points to the importance of the intention-based motive. However, when 
the proposer has no option but to choose the unequal offer, still a substantial number of 
responders (18%) reject. As there is no intention for the proposer to favor herself, this 
observation suggests that inequity aversion triggers rejections. Other experiments (e.g., on 
the convex ultimatum game,3 Andreoni, Castillo & Petrie, 2003, on the three-person 
ultimatum games,4 Bereby-Meyer & Niederle, 2005, and on a three-person gift exchange 
game,5 Thöni & Gächter, 2007) have shown that fairness can hardly be explained by 
inequity aversion and reciprocity alone. 
 
The experimental results for the ultimatum-revenge game support the previous findings 
that fairness subsumes several motives. The results stem from a sizable number of 
responders’ rejections that indicate inequity aversion. On the other hand, a substantial 
number of responders behave reciprocally. However, for the majority of responders, 
responses indicate a mix of both motives. And the combination changes between mildly 
                                                 
3 The convex ultimatum game has the following structure: A proposer receives an endowment and has to 
offer the responder a share of the endowment. The responder either accepts the offer, keeping the offer for 
herself, while the proposer earns the endowment minus the offer, or she rejects the offer and determines the 
factor by which both payoffs are shrunk. 
4 The ultimatum game has the following structure: The proposer receives an endowment and has to offer the 
responder a share from the endowment. The responder either accepts the offer, keeping the offer for herself, 
while the proposer earns the endowment minus the offer, or the responder rejects the offer, which leads to a 
low-conflict payoff for herself and the proposer (standard ultimatum game) or for herself and a third party 
while the proposer receives nothing (three-person ultimatum game). 
5 The three-person gift exchange game has the following structure: Two persons receive unconditional gifts 
from the third person. Then, the two persons have to make effort decisions that cause costs to them but 
yield a payoff to the third person. 6 
unequal offers and strongly unequal offers. For the majority of the responders showing 
intermediate responses, I can estimate a non-positive taste parameter supporting the 
principle of appropriateness. 
 
The remaining article is organized as follows: Section two introduces the ultimatum-
revenge game. Section three will develop the principle of appropriateness and discusses 
behavioral expectations for the ultimatum-revenge game. Section four analyzes the 
experimental data with respect to these predictions. Finally, section five concludes the 
article. 
 
2. The ultimatum-revenge game 
The ultimatum-revenge game is a simple bargaining game with two players. A proposer is 
endowed with some monetary pie of size P. The proposer has to offer x out of P to the 
responder. If the responder accepts the offer, the proposer keeps the remaining P – x, 
while the responder earns x. If the responder rejects the offer, the responder earns κx 
with a commonly known parameter κ ∈ [0,1), while the responder can freely determine 
the earnings of the proposer (the “revenge”), denoted as y, from the interval y ∈ [0,P – 
κx]. Therefore, the payoff functions for the proposer, πp, and the responder, πr, 
respectively, are 
πp = δ (P – x) + (1 – δ) y  
πr = κx + δ (1 – κ) x,                (1) 7 
where δ = 1 if the responder accepts the offer x, and δ = 0 otherwise. Figure 1 illustrates 
the game tree of the ultimatum-revenge game. If the responder rejects the offer, his payoff 
is denoted as the conflict payment. Obviously, assuming both players to have pure selfish 
preferences yields subgame perfect Nash-equilibria, which are identical with respect to x 
and δ to the one in the standard ultimatum game. For any x > 0, it is not optimal to reject, 
while for x = 0, the responder is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer. 
Since for the first case, the corresponding conflict payoff is smaller than the offer, 
responders will accept any positive offer. Anticipating this, proposers choose the smallest 
possible offer x′ leading to subgame perfect equilibria x = x′, δ = 1, and 0 ≤ y ≤ P – κx′.6 
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Henceforth, I will focus almost exclusively on the behavior of the responder. The 
responder's decision is non-strategic in the sense that the responder does not take any 
further possible actions of other players into account; the game terminates after his 
decision. By contrast, the proposer's decision combines both, own fairness considerations 
as well as the belief about the fairness considerations of the responder. Therefore, only 
responder's decision in the ultimatum-revenge game allows me to observe behavior that is 
not contaminated by strategic reasoning.  
 
Restricting the y set to y ≡ 0 and setting the parameterisation κ = 0 yields the standard 
two-person ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982). However, 
rejections in the standard ultimatum game may show inequity aversion – responders favor 
an equal split {0, 0} compared to a more unequal distribution of the pie – but may also 
exhibit a hostile answer to an unkind offer. The “unrestricted” ultimatum-revenge game 
imposes no marginal costs for responders to alter proposers’ payoffs providing responders 
the opportunity to differentiate their disapproval of an unacceptable offer.7 The results 
obtained for responders' decisions in the ultimatum-revenge game extend the results of 
previous experiments that estimate interdependent preferences by using decisions in 
dictator games8 (e.g., Andreoni & Miller, 2002, Fisman, Kariv & Markovits, 2007) by the – 
potential – influence of reciprocity for the responder's behavior, as well as previous 
                                                                                                                                                          
equilibria x = 0, δ = {0,1}, 0 ≤ y ≤ P (yielding an uncertain payoff). 
7 In the real world, for instance, workers instead of quitting the job, slow down their effort, or refuse to 
work overtime. 9 
experimental evidence on other modified ultimatum games.9 Those studies have focussed 
predominantly on the robustness of the prediction based on inequity aversion (Kagel & 
Wolfe, 2001, Andreoni, Castillo & Petrie, 2003). They found a sizable number of 
responders showing behavior consistent with inequity aversion. Yet again, there are also 
substantial numbers of subjects whose behavior is inconsistent with inequity aversion, but 
indicates reciprocity. The current study continues this line of research in the way that 
responders' decisions in the ultimatum-revenge game allow me to analyze their motives in 
greater detail and to test whether the mix of motives differs over several offers. For this 
purpose, I apply the strategy vector method for responders (Selten, 1967). This means that 
responders have to decide for all possible (integer) offers before they are informed about 
the actual offer. Then, the offer and the corresponding responder decision determine the 
payoffs.10  
 
3. The principle of appropriateness 
The following section introduces the principle of appropriateness. This principle will 
allow me to formalize a gradual transition between the distributional motive and the 
intention-based motive in a simple model of fairness preferences. I will avoid inessential 
elaboration and specification of intention based, or distributional preferences. Therefore, I 
                                                                                                                                                          
8 The dictator game simplifies the strategic interaction between players such that responders cannot reject 
the offer proposed by the dictator, who keeps the pie minus the offer. Hence, there is no response in the 
dictator game. 
9 For instance, see the experiments on the convex ultimatum game (e.g., see Suleiman, 1996, Charness & 
Rabin, 2002). 
10 Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson (1994), Cason and Mui (1998), Brandts and Charness (2000) and Güth, Huck 
and Müller (2001) do not find significant differences in behavior among the strategy and direct response 
method. 10 
will not test, for instance, which specification of distributional preferences fit 
experimental data better (which has been done elsewhere, e.g., Engelmann & Strobel, 
2004). Rather, I will characterize all models by first order and second order derivatives of 
a motivation function,11 according to which subjects try to optimize their behavior. 
 
Two general claims will be captured by the motivational function. First, and commonly in 
economics, it is assumed that more money is preferred to less money. Second, and 
departing from the perspective of narrowly self-interested players, it is assumed that 
people care for the payoffs of others. Thus, a motivation function vi of player i is subject to 
two independent variables, i’s payoff, πi and some term referring to the payoff of the 
reference player’s payoff (or the sum of reference players’ payoffs, if there are more than 
one),12 denoted as z. With respect to the first claim, all preference models share the 
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In a first step, I will formulate the second claim as distributional preferences. According to 
distributional preferences, subjects draw – in addition to the utility they gain from their 
own monetary payoff – disutility from inequality between payoffs. Subjects are inequity 
                                                 
11 All models formalize evidence that is mainly collected in n-person laboratory games, where a player 
interacts anonymously, and, if she plays the game several times, she never plays the game with any 
particular subject more than once. Undoubtedly, other factors like political or religious belief, education or 
age influence behavior, but are not formalized in the models. Therefore, in accordance with Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), I prefer to speak about “motivation functions” rather than utility functions, since the 
scope of objectives formulated in these functions are focused on this very narrow and abstract setting. 
12 Determining the relevant reference group in the real world appears to be a difficult task. Concerning the 
scope of the motivation function in the experiment, the reference players are more obvious, namely all 
interaction partners. Yet, in some experiments, this task is still not trivial (see, e.g., Thöni & Gächter, 2007). 11 
averse with respect to payoff differences. Inequity aversion can be formulated either 
directly as the absolute difference between payoffs (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) or indirectly as 
the individual share of the total sum of payoffs (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). In the 
following, I will apply only the indirect way.13 Therefore, let z measure the difference in 
relative shares of payoffs between player i and the reference players,  n π π z
j j i 1 : − = ∑ . 
Inequity aversion suggests for the motivation function vi  the following:  
() ( )
,    if      0
,













∂           (3) 
where z0 = 0. Equation (3) states that fixing player i’s payoff, there is a local maximum of 
the motivation function given the equal distribution of payoffs among players. Suppose 
there are only two players and i’s payoff remains constant at some 
i π ~; i chooses between z' 
and z", where z' = 0, but z"  ≠ 0. Then, i prefers the first alternative since  ) , ~ ( z π v i i ′  exceeds 
) , ~ ( z π v i i ′ ′ .  
 
A simple modification of our motivation function vi will allow us to incorporate intention 
based motives in the model: let z0 ∈ {–1/n, 0, (n–1)/n}.  The value z0 = (n–1)/n (z0 = –1/n) 
characterizes the case that i’s relative share of profit equals one (zero), so that she earns 
everything (nothing) in the first (second) case. How does this relate to intention-based 
preferences? According to intention-based preference models (e.g., Dufwenberg & 
Kirchsteiger, 2004, Falk & Fischbacher, 2006, Cox, Friedman & Gjerstad, 2007), subjects 
                                                 
13 The direct way requires  ∑ ≠ − = i j j i n z π π 1 : . Elaborating the indirect way of inequity aversion does not 
mean that I consider this approach as being superior, but it simplifies notation considerably. 12 
prefer to reciprocate; they like to respond kindly to perceived kindness and they prefer to 
reciprocate unkindly to perceived unkindness.14  
 
For this purpose, a kindness term φ evaluates the perceived treatment – in the case of 
simultaneous moves the expected treatment – by another player  (see, e.g., Falk & 
Fischbacher, 2006). Formally, let us assume a game with sequential moves where player i 
observes preceding moves. l1, l2, …, lm denote all those end nodes of the game where i 
chooses her payoff maximizing best response strategy to any previous treatment (e.g., in 
the ultimatum-revenge game, the responder accepts the offer) and πi (l1), …, πi (lm) the 
corresponding payoff of i. Then φ: l  ℜ a   is a strictly increasing function such that φ(ls) 
> φ(lt) if πi (ls) > πi (lt),  φ(ls) > 0 if πi (ls) > ∏, φ(ls) < 0 if πi (ls) < ∏, and φ(ls) = 0 if πi (ls) = 
∏, where ∏ :=  ( ) m l k k i ∑ π . Hence, responders in the ultimatum-revenge game perceive an 
offer (un)kindly if the offer is higher (lower) than the equal split of P. A similar rational 
applies for i’s responses; player i responses (un)kindly, if the payoff for the other player is 
higher (lower) than the average payoff for the opponent. Overall, intention based 
preference models frame reciprocity as the product of perceived kindness and the 
kindness of the response. That is, fixing player i’s payoff at 
i π ~, if she has been treated 
unkindly, she increases the value of her motivation function by increasing the unkindness 
of her response, while the value decreases by increasing the kindness of her response. 
Likewise, if she has been treated kindly, she increases the value of her motivation 
                                                 
14 The importance of reciprocity become evidently if experiments rule out intentions exogenously. Blount 
(1995) and Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2008) can show that behavior differs significantly between a game 13 
function by increasing the kindness of her response and the value decreases by increasing 
the unkindness of her response. Therefore, referring to our motivation function 
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Recall that the marginal cost for responders to alter the proposers’ payoff in the case of a 
rejection is zero. Responders directly reveal the z they prefer the most. On the other 
hand, offers can be directly interpreted with respect to φ. Therefore, I get extreme 
predictions concerning responder’s decision on y if she rejects an offer. Summarizing the 
findings: 
•  for distributional preferences, the responder maximizes the value of the motivation 
function by z = 0 implying that y = κx,  
•  for intention-based preferences, the responder maximizes the value of the 
motivation function by z = (n-1)/n implying that y = 0 if x < P/2, and by z = –1/n 
implying that y = P– κx if x > P/2.15 
Finally, mixing both motives suggests a linear combination of the previous predictions. 
That is, z0 ∈ [–1/n, 0] if φ > 0, and z0 ∈ [0, (n–1)/n] if φ < 0, where in the first case (nz0 + 1) 
(in the second case 1 – nz0/(n–1)) characterizes the relative importance of the 
distributional motive and z0 (nz0/(n–1)) the relative importance of the intention-based  
motive for fairness.  
                                                                                                                                                          
where computers randomly generate moves for opponents and the same game where opponents choose for 
themselves. 
15 No model predicts the rejection of an equal offer of x = P/2. 14 
A fundamental problem occurs if responders change z for varying offers. I will interpret 
the fact that responders are inequity averse for some offers, while reciprocal for others, as 
follows: The principle of appropriateness orders potential offers such that it provides 
responders with the intuition when it is appropriate to respond inequity aversely and 
when to respond reciprocally.  
 
However, when is it appropriate to respond inequity aversely or reciprocally? Previous 
experiments suggest this itself to be simply a matter of reciprocity; subjects tend to 
intensify the harshness of their responses the harsher they have been treated. For 
instance, several experiments on Stackelberg competition find an upward-sloping 
response function of following players (e.g., Huck, Müller & Normann, 2001, 2002). In 
contrast to theoretical predictions, players intensify competition only if the leading 
players have intensified their pricing. Applying this finding to the ultimatum-revenge 
game, one can expect z to be a monotone decreasing function on the perceived kindness of 
the reference player, z  :  φ ( ] n n n ) 1 ( , 1 − − a  such that  0 ) ( ≤ ∂ ∂ ϕ ϕ z . Therefore, the 
principle of appropriateness relaxes reciprocity models such that it suggests a gradual 
change concerning the extremeness of responses for increasing (un)kindness. Calculating 
the kindness function φ for offers in the ultimatum-revenge game yields φ = 0 for x = P/2 
and  0 > ∂ ∂ x ϕ . Thus I expect to find a non-positive relation between z and x – P/2. Of 
course, one can interpret “pure type” reciprocity and “pure type” inequity aversion as 
limit cases for the principle of appropriateness. That is, if we allow for individual 15 
differences concerning the absolute value of  ϕ ϕ ∂ ∂ ) ( z , a sufficiently large slope yields 
“pure type” reciprocity, while zero slope yields “pure type” inequity aversion.  
 
Finally, recall that responders can choose y from the interval [0,P – κx] if rejecting an 
offer x. This raises the question how we interpret y > P/2 for offers x < P/2?16 Those 
responses conflict with both intention-based preferences and distributional preferences. 
However, there is evidence that efficiency or social welfare considerations crucially 
influence behavior in distributional tasks (see, e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002, Engelmann & 
Strobel, 2004). Responders’ efficiency considerations could reduce their willingness to 
vanish payoffs for revenge. Hence, I will argue that any response y > P/2 for offers x < P/2 
indicates responders’ efficiency considerations.  
 
4. Experimental results 
The laboratory experiments were conducted at the EconLab at the University of Bonn, 
Germany, in October and November 2006.17 Copies of the instructions were handed out to 
participants and read aloud thereafter.18 Participants’ questions concerning the 
experiments were then answered privately by the instructors. Finally, all participants had 
to answer an electronic questionnaire testing their understanding of the game and of the 
payoff structure.19 Before participants answered the questionnaire, it was made clear that 
                                                 
16 Notice that the opposite case, y < P/2 for x > P/2, has hardly been observed in previous experiments. 
17 Experiments were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). For the recruitment of subjects, I used 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
18 Translations of the original instructions are presented in Appendix A. 
19 Translations of the original questions are presented in Appendix B. 16 
the only purpose of the questionnaire was to improve the understanding of the rules of 
the game. Wrong answers were privately explained and corrected before the experiment 
started. Each participant played one anonymous ultimatum-revenge game either in the 
role of the proposer or in the role of the responder. In the instructions, I referred to 
proposers as persons A and to responders as persons B. The pie size was set to P = 12 Euro. 
Offers could only be made in integers. Applying the strategy vector method, responders 
had to make a total of 13 acceptance/rejection decisions and, if they rejected offers, 
determine the payoff of proposers. In contrast to the standard procedure of the strategy 
vector method, responders were not provided with a choice menu, that is, a decision sheet 
that presents all potential offers in an ascending or descending order. Rather, potential 
offers were presented sequentially; the order of possible offers differed randomly for all 
responders. I introduced the random procedure in order to make each decision as realistic 
as possible and to avoid possible order effects. Therefore, offers were presented one after 
another without being able to change them once they were submitted. Thereafter, 
responders were asked to state which offer they considered as fair, and which offer they 
expected to receive. Then, an offer of one proposer was randomly assigned to a decision 
vector of one responder, and payoffs were realized according to the decisions made by the 
responder for this particular offer. Participants were informed about their payoffs. Finally, 
participants had to answer a short socio-demographic questionnaire, before picking up 
their payoffs in private. Participants were mostly undergraduate students from various 
fields of studies. Approximately one third of the students were economists or 
mathematicians, making it potentially easier for them to compute the subgame perfect 17 
Nash equilibria.20 In total, 306 subjects participated; half of all subjects were females. The 
median age was 23 years.  
 
In order to test the robustness of fairness in the ultimatum-revenge game, I introduced 
two treatment conditions. For one condition, high, the commonly known parameter κ is 
set to κ = 0.5, while in the other condition, low, κ = 0.25. In total, 76 proposers and 76 
responders participated in the high treatment, while 77 proposers and 77 responders 
participated in the low condition. The average length of the experiment was 30 minutes, 
including the instruction time and the time for paying off subjects. 84% of actual offers in 
the  high condition (81% in the low condition) were accepted; average payoffs for 
proposers were 5.52 Euro in high and 5.43 Euro in low (standard deviations 1.90 and 
2.61, respectively), average payoffs for responders were 5.24 Euro in high and 4.42 Euro 
in low (standard deviations 1.59 and 2.01, respectively). The average offer made in the 
high condition, 5.55, is significantly higher than the average offer made in the low 
condition, 4.81.21 In line with findings in other ultimatum experiments (e.g., see Camerer, 
2003), the result can be explained by the fact that for a given offer, the responder has a 
higher conflict payoff in the high condition than in the low condition. Proposers 
increase offers for increasing conflict payoffs. 
 
                                                 
20 Some authors have stressed the importance of education for fairness considerations in simple distribution 
games (Fehr, Naef & Schmidt, 2006). I control for this effect below. 
21 p = 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided. Notice that there is no significant difference between offers 
made by economists/mathematicians and other participants in both treatment conditions (p  > 0.05, 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, two-sided). 18 
The mean expected offers are 5.47 in the high condition and 5.26 in the low condition. 
There is no significant difference between expected offers and actual offers in both 
treatment conditions.22 Moreover, there is no treatment effect with respect to expected 
offers and fair offers stated by responders.23 However, mean expected offers are significant 
smaller than the stated fair offers, 6.02 and 5.88, respectively,24 while there is no 
significant difference between stated fair offers by responders in the low and in the high 
condition.25 Hence, there is a treatment effect for proposers' behavior, while the results 
for expectations and fair offers of responders are hardly influenced by conflict payoffs. 
 
4.1 Rejections 
For the analysis of rejection decisions, I will define an upper and a lower acceptance 
threshold for responder i, trui and trli, as following 
 
trui:= max {x | δi (x) =1}   and  
trli:= min {x | δi (x) =1},                (5) 
where δi (x) denotes the acceptance decision of responder i for a certain offer x. Note that 
inequity aversion and reciprocity predict regularity with respect to rejections, that is, δi (x) 
= 1 ∀ x  ∈ [trli, trui]. In total, 32 out of 153 responders exhibit rejection decisions that 
                                                 
22 p > 0.05, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, two-sided. 
23 p = 0.52, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided. Again, testing expected offers and stated fair offers by 
economists/mathematicians and other participants reveals no significant differences in both treatment 
conditions (p > 0.05, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, two-sided). 
24 p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, one-sided. 
25 p = 0.53, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided. 19 
violate regularity.26 The further analysis also includes the data of responders violating 
rejection regularity. Responders are classified according to their acceptance thresholds; 
Table 1 reports the number of responders in each lower and upper acceptance class, ||trli|| 
and ||trui||, respectively. 
Table 1: Numbers of responders according to acceptance thresholds 
 || trli||            || trli||      sum 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  9 10 11 12    
high  4 7 5 6 6  38  9 1  1  1 10 64   76 
low  1 11 9 10  18  23 5  0    0  1  5  71   77 
 
Responders with trui = 12 and either trli = 0 or trli = 1 behave in accordance to selfish 
individual utility maximization, since standard game theory predicts responders to accept 
any positive offer except x = 0 where responders are indifferent between accepting and 
rejecting. In total, only 10 responders do so.27 Hence, comparison with typical results from 
other variations of the ultimatum game (e.g., see Andreoni, Castillo & Petrie, 2003), the 
                                                 
26 Among these 32 responders are 8 economists/mathematicians. This proportion does not differ significantly 
from the proportion of economists/mathematicians in the population of experimental participants (p = 0.352, 
binomial test). These are more responders to behave irregularly than typically observed (see Camerer, 2003). 
However, there is a simple reason for this substantial number of violations. I can attribute most of them to 
the difficulty arising from the random order procedure of presenting possible offers. Responders submit 
their decision one after another without being able to change their decisions once they have submitted 
them. Of course, this procedure is less abstract than a decision sheet that presents potential offers in some 
kind of menu. Yet, this procedure is prone to error. If I relax the definition of rejection regularity and allow 
for one wrong decision at the most, the number of responders exhibiting irregular rejections reduces 
considerably to 9 subjects, which corresponds to approximately 6% of all responders (again, the proportion 
of economists/mathematicians, 2, among these 9 subjects does not differ significantly from the proportion of 
economists/mathematicians in the population of experimental participants, p = 0.728, binomial test). 
27 Particularly, 3 responders in the high and 7 in the low condition do so. The proportion of 
economists/mathematicians in the group of rational responders, 6, differs weak significantly from the 
proportion of economists/mathematicians in the overall population of responders (p = 0.098, binomial test). 20 
ultimatum-revenge game yields much less selfish behavior by responders. The average trli 
is 4.08 for the high and 3.58 for the low condition; the mean trui is 11.80 for the high 
and 11.91 for the low condition.28 With respect to the interaction between the lower and 
the upper threshold, one would expect a strongly negative correlation. That is, responders 
who have a small lower acceptance threshold indicating a high sensitivity for own 
material payoffs, are expected to exhibit also a large upper acceptance threshold indicating 
again a high sensitivity of own material payoffs. However, there is only a small, 
insignificant correlation between trli and trui of 0.05 for high and 0.13 for low.29 Yet, 
there are significant correlations between the stated fair offers and the lower acceptance 
threshold, which are 0.29 for high and 0.27 for low,30 while there are no significant 
correlations between the stated fair offer and the upper acceptance threshold, which are 
0.098 for high and 0.023 for low.31 Overall, there is a significant difference between trli 
in the high condition and trli in the low condition.32 Responders are more likely to 
accept lower offers in the low condition than in the high condition.33 However, for trui 
no significant difference between treatment conditions can be found.34 
 
                                                 
28 There are no significant differences between average lower and average upper acceptance threshold of 
economists/mathematicians and other participants in both treatment conditions (p > 0.05, Welch Two 
Sample tests, two-sided). 
29 p = 0.691 for high and p = 0.26 for low, Pearson's correlation test, two-sided. Testing these and all 
following correlations for economists/mathematicians separately lead to the same qualitative results as for all 
subjects using Pearson's correlation tests, two-sided. 
30 p = 0.01 for high and p = 0.02 for low, Pearson's correlation test, two-sided. 
31 p = 0.40 for high and p = 0.84 for low, Pearson's correlation test, two-sided. 
32 p < 0.001, Fisher's exact test. 
33 There is no significant difference between average lower and average upper acceptance thresholds of 
economists/mathematicians and other participants in both treatment conditions (p > 0.05, Welch Two 
Sample tests, two-sided). 
34 p = 0.11, Fisher's exact test. 21 
To summarize the results for rejection behavior of responders, the ultimatum-revenge game 
yields less selfish behavior than other variations of the ultimatum game. Supporting earlier 
experimental results (e.g., Zwick & Chen, 1999), lower conflict payments in the low 
condition increase the average acceptance of smaller offers. Finally and quite astonishingly, 




In order to classify the responses of responders, I define for each rejected offer x and the 
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where d(y) ∈ [–1,1]. d(y) = –1 characterizes unkind responses according to the previous 
definition, so that d(y) = –1 ∀ x < P/2 where δ = 0 corresponds to reciprocal responses of i 
to unkind offers. Likewise, following inequity aversion, d(y) = 0 ∀ x where δ  = 0 
characterizes inequity averse responses of i. Finally, d(y) = 1 ∀ x > P/2 where δ  = 0 
indicates reciprocal responses of i. However, I have to stress an important difficulty. 
Obviously, choosing y = 0 for a rejected offer of x = 0 is an unkind as well as an equitable 
response. For this offer, I cannot differentiate between the two motives35 and (6) is not 
defined. Therefore, I will exclude the decisions for x = 0 from further analysis. Finally, 
there are ten responders who behave selfishly. There is no valid response y observed for 
them, so that their mean distance to equity is not defined, which I denote with ∅. For 22 
remaining responders, I obtain a classification of responders according to their average 
distance of their responses to equity. The numbers of responders within each response 
class, ||d(y)||, are reported is Table 2. 
Table 2: Numbers of responders according to mean d(y) 
 || d(y)||              sum 
  -1 (-1,0) 0  (0,1)  1  ∅   
high  14 33 11 14  0  4   76 
low  26  17 9 17 0  8    77 
 
The data show a large heterogeneity in responders' motives. In both treatment conditions, 
only a small minority of responders behaves selfishly. Some responses reveal inequity 
aversion, some reciprocity,36 while for a considerable number of responders in both 
treatment conditions the average d(y) indicates a mix of both motives.37 Furthermore, 
some responders exhibit an average d(y) larger than zero, suggesting some efficiency 
considerations.38 Overall, the mean distance is –0.35 for all subjects in the high condition 
and –0.42 in the low condition. Thus one could say that the average responder mixes both 
motives. The distributional motive appears to be slightly more important (approximately 
sixty percent) than the intention based motive (approximately forty percent). However, 
                                                                                                                                                          
35 See the discussion for the standard ultimatum game in the previous section. 
36 One can think of reciprocal responders choosing y = 0 for some x < P/2 and y = P – κx for some x > P/2 
yielding an average d(y)∈(–1,1). However, no responder does so. 
37 The effect of responses to the rejected offer x > P/2 for the classification of responders is almost negligible 
due to the insufficient number of observations (6 responders), so that I will not present separate 
classifications according to cases x ≤ P/2 and x > P/2. 23 
the reciprocity becomes more important in the low condition (that is, if conflict payoffs 
of responders decrease).   
 
Furthermore, I find on average a positive relation between the offer and the mean d(y) for 
responses smaller than the equal split. As shown in Figure 2, for very low offers, responses 
tend to be unkind, while rejected offers close to the equal split are responded more 
equally; again, decreasing the conflict payment shifts average responses in the low 
condition to the lower bound of d(y) compared with the high condition. 
 
The experimental findings cannot identify a dominant motive for responders’ behavior.  
Rather, there is a large heterogeneity among responders’ motives; inequity aversion, 
reciprocity, and even efficiency considerations matter. The average results (Figure 2) 
suggest a transition between fairness motives: for very small offers, responders seems to be 
motivated by intentional based preferences, while for higher, but nonetheless 
unacceptable offers, distributional preferences motivate responses. In the consecutive 
section, I will analyze whether one finds this result even on the level of individual 
responders.     
                                                                                                                                                          
38 Notice that for both treatment conditions the majorities of responders with irregular rejections, 11 
responders in the high and 7 responders in the low condition, are classified in the class (0,1). This is due to 
the fact that most of the responses for obviously mistakenly rejected offers are such that y > κx. 24 
Figure 2: Mean distance from equity 
 
 
4.3 Individual taste parameters 
For the test of the principle of appropriateness on the level of each individual responder, I 
will capitalize on the fact that I observe – for the majority of responders – several y. These 
observations enable me to estimate for each responder the relation between the offer x 
and the responder’s relative share of the conflict payment, z. Recall that I hypothesize a 
non-positive relation between x and z such that 
() ) 2 / ( 2 1 P x y x x i − = − + β κ κ ,       ( 8 )  
where the individual taste parameter βi is non-positive. There are extreme cases for 
appropriateness: for pure inequity-averse responders, I will find z = 0 ∀ δ = 0 leading to βi 
= 0; for pure reciprocal responders, I will find z = 1/2 ∀ δ = 0 and x < P/2, and z = κx/P– 25 
1/2 ∀ δ = 0 and x > P/2. This means that the corresponding taste parameter is negative and 
its absolute value so large that they choose y = 0 whenever they reject unkind offers and y 
= P–κx whenever they reject kind offers. I will define for these responders  −∞ ≡ ∂ ∂ x z .39 
From the 141 subjects whose trli > 1, the results show for 106 subjects consistent 
estimations of the taste parameter (among them are 40 pure reciprocal and 20 pure 
inequity adverse responders). Particularly, for subjects whose  ) 0 , (−∞ ∈ z , the mean drift is 
–0.047 in the high condition and –0.043 in the low  condition.40 Consequently, 
decreasing the offer by one Euro increases on average the responder’s most preferable 
share according to the definition of the left hand side of (8) by approximately 4.5% 
compared to an offer of the equal split. This means that a responder who rejects five Euros 
chooses on average y = 2.09 in the high condition (y = 1.04 in the low condition) which 
corresponds to z = 0.54, whereas a responder who rejects one Euro chooses on average y = 
0.19 (y = 0.09) which corresponds with z = 0.72. 
 
Summarizing the experimental evidence, there is a majority of responders whose behavior 
can be explained in the framework of the principle of appropriateness. Of course, the fit of 
this approach is partly attributed to responders whose choices persistently indicate the 
intentional based motive or the distributional motive, since appropriateness nests those 
two approaches. However, this model can integrate additional observations; 46 subjects in 
                                                 
39 The estimation for the taste parameters of all other responders will again rely only on observed y 
corresponding to x > 0, since (8) is not defined for y = 0 and, more importantly, the setup of the game 
excludes choices for responders that yield z > 0. 
40 The difference between the mean parameters where  ) 0 , (−∞ ∈ z  differ insignificantly across treatment 
conditions (p = 0.79, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided). 26 
the experiment gradually alter responses consistently with the principle of 
appropriateness. When rejecting less unkind offers, they choose for proposers 
approximately the same amount as they receive, while they choose zero payoffs for 
proposers responding to very unkind offers. Nevertheless, there are other motives for 
fairness like social welfare or efficiency considerations as 36 responders behave 
inconsistently with the principle of appropriateness.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Along previous studies, this paper finds that fairness subsumes a large variety of motives 
(e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002, Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). The experimental results 
for the ultimatum-revenge game demonstrate that a single motive for fairness falls short 
of characterizing the behavior of responders sufficiently. The classification of subjects 
with respect to their mean response shows that there are responders who decide in 
accordance with inequity aversion, others decide in accordance with reciprocity, and 
some even indicate some efficiency considerations. Yet, for a majority of subjects, choices 
suggest a mix of the intention-based motive and distributional motive.  
 
The individual data for a considerable number of responders show a gradual transition 
between both motives when rejecting several offers. That is, when treated mildly 
unkindly, they like to respond mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh 
reactions. I formalize this observation in the principle of appropriateness which predicts a 
non-positive relation between the perceived unkindness of the other person (i.e., the 27 
difference between the equal split of P and the offer in the ultimatum-response game) and 
the relative share of the own conflict payoff (i.e., z). Overall, the behavior of 118 out of 
153 responders fit the predictions (12 selfish responders and 106 responders with a 
reciprocal, inequity averse or mixed taste parameters). For the remaining 36 responders, 
other motives like social welfare or efficiency may have influenced the decisions. In this 
sense, the principle of appropriateness is another sufficiently simple approach that 
hopefully grasps an important feature of fairness. Yet, I consider this principle as 






Andreoni, J., M. Castillo & R. Petrie (2003), What do bargainers' preferences look like? Experiments with a 
convex ultimatum game, American Economic Review 93, 672-685. 
 
Andreoni, J. & J. Miller (2002), Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of 
preferences for altruism, Econometrica 70, 737-753. 
 
Battigalli, P., & M. Dufwenberg (2007), Guilt in games, American Economic Review 97, 170-176. 
 
Bereby-Meyer, Y. & M. Niederle (2005), Fairness in bargaining, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 56, 173–-186. 
 
B l o u n t ,  S .  ( 1 9 9 5 ) ,  W h e n  s o c i a l  o u t c o m e s  a r e n ’ t  f a i r :  T h e  e f f e c t  o f  c a u s a l  a t t r i b u t i o n s  o n  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 63, 131–144. 
 
Bolton, G.E. & A. Ockenfels (2000), ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition, American 
Economic Review 90, 166-193. 
 
Bolton, G.E. & A. Ockenfels (2005), A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility, Economic 
Theory 25, 957-982. 
 
Brandts, J. & G. Charness (2000), Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental 
games, Experimental Economics 2, 227-238. 
 
Camerer, C.F. (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Charness, G. & M. Rabin (2002), Understanding social preferences with simple tests, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 117, 817-869. 
 
Cason, T.N. & V.-L. Mui (1998), Social influence in the sequential dictator game, Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology 42, 248-265. 
 
Cox, J.C., D. Friedman & S. Gjerstad (2007), A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness, Games and 
Economic Behavior 59, 17-45. 
 29 
Dufwenberg, M. & G. Kirchsteiger (2004), A theory of sequential reciprocity, Games and Economic 
Behavior 47, 268-298. 
 
Engelmann, D. & M. Strobel (2004), Inequity aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple 
distribution experiments, American Economic Review 94, 857-869. 
 
Falk, A. & U. Fischbacher (2006), A theory of reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior 54, 293-315. 
 
Falk, A., E. Fehr & U. Fischbacher (2003), On the nature of fair behavior, Economic Inquiry 41, 20-26. 
 
Falk, A., E. Fehr & U. Fischbacher (2008), Testing theories of fairness – Intentions matter, Games and 
Economic Behavior 62, 287-303. 
 
Fehr, E., M. Naef & K.M. Schmidt (2006), Inequality aversion, efficiency and maximin preferences in simple 
distribution games: Comment, American Economic Review 96, 1912-1917. 
 
Fehr, E. & K.M. Schmidt (1999), A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 114, 817-868. 
 
Fehr, E. & K.M. Schmidt (2006), The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism – Experimental 
evidence and new theories. In: Kolm, S.-C. & J.M, Ythier (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, 
Altruism and Reciprocity, Volume I, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 615-694. 
 
Fischbacher, U. (2007), z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, Experimental 
Economics 10, 171-178. 
 
Fisman, R., S. Kariv & D. Markovits (2007), Individual preferences for giving, American Economic Review 
97, 1858-1876. 
 
Greiner, B. (2004), An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In: Kremer, K. & Macho, V. 
(eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003, GWDG Bericht 63, Göttingen: Gesellschaft für 
Wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung, 79-93. 
 
Güth, W., S. Huck & W. Müller (2001), The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games, Games and 
Economic Behavior 37, 161-169. 
 30 
Güth, W., R. Schmittberger & B. Schwarze (1982), An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 367-388. 
 
Huck, S., W. Müller & H.-T. Normann (2001), Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion and efficiency in 
experimental markets, The Economic Journal 111, 749–765. 
 
Huck, S., W. Müller & H.-T. Normann (2002), To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in 
experimental duopoly markets, Games and Economic Behavior 38, 240–264. 
 
Kagel, J. & K. Wolfe (2001), Tests of fairness models based on equity considerations in a three-person 
ultimatum game, Experimental Economics 4, 203-219. 
 
Rabin, M. (1993), Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, American Economic Review 83, 
1281-1302. 
 
Schotter, A., K. Weigelt & C. Wilson (1994), A laboratory investigation of multiperson rationality and 
presentation effects, Games and Economic Behavior 6, 445-468. 
 
Selten, R. (1967), Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens im 
Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments. In: H. Sauermann (ed.), Beiträge zur experimentellen 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 136-168. 
 
Sobel, J. (2005), Interdependent preferences and reciprocity, Journal of Economic Literature 43, 392-436. 
 
Suleiman, R. (1996), Expectations and fairness in a modified ultimatum game, Journal of Economic 
Psychology 17, 531-554. 
 
Thöni, C. & S. Gächter (2007), Understanding social interaction effects in the workplace, Working Paper, 
University of St.Gallen. 
 
Zwick, R. & X.-P. Chen (1999), What price fairness? A bargaining study, Management Science 45, 804-823. 31 
Appendix: A. Instructions41 
Thank you for participating in our experiment! In this experiment, you will make 
decisions with which you can earn money. How much you will earn depends on your 
decisions and the decisions of other participants. Please read these instructions very 
carefully. We kindly ask you to refrain from any public announcements and attempts to 
communicate directly with other participants during the experiment. If you violate this 
rule, we have to exclude you from this experiment. If you have any questions, please 
contact one of the persons running the experiment, he or she will come to your place and 
clarify your questions. 
 
The decision task 
In this experiment, you and another person will interact only once. Except for us, the 
experimenters, no participant is able to identify the other participant. At the beginning of 
the experiment, one of the two persons will be randomly selected as person A, the other 
person as person B. Person A receives an amount of 12 euros from the experimenter. Out 
of these 12 euros, she offers a proposal to person B. The proposal can be any amount 
between 0 and 12 euros. However, the proposal must be an amount in whole euros. If 
person B accepts the proposal, she earns the proposal. Person A earns the rest of the 12 
euros (12 – proposal). If B rejects the proposal, she earns the half of the proposal42 and 
                                                 
41 This is the translation of the German instructions for the high condition. Differences in the low 
condition are marked by footnotes. 
42 “a quarter of the proposal”. 32 
decides on the amount person A will earn. This can be any amount from the remaining 
rest (between 0 and 12 – proposal/2).43 
Example: Person A proposes 5 euros. If person B accepts the proposal, person A earns 7 
euros (12 – 5). If person B rejects the proposal, person B earns 2.50 euros (proposal/2).44 
Then, person B determines the earnings of person A, choosing an amount between 0 and 
9.50 (12 – 2.50) euros.45 
 
The setup of the experiment 
Before we start with the experiment, you will receive an electronic questionnaire which 
you have to fill in completely. The questionnaire helps you to understand the rules of the 
experiment. After all participants have completed the questionnaire correctly, you will be 
randomly selected as person A or person B. Then, person A has to decide on the proposal 
she will offer to person B. The proposal must be an amount in whole euros. At the same 
time, person B has to decide whether to accept or to reject for all possible proposals (0 
euros, 1 euro,..., 12 euros), and, if rejecting an offer, which amount person A will earn. 
The possible proposals will be shown to person B in a random order. Please note that you 
cannot change your decision once you have confirmed it. Thereafter, we will ask person B 
which proposal she considers as fair and which proposal she expects to receive from 
person  A. When each person B  has decided on all possible proposals, we will select 
randomly and anonymously for each person A a person B. Payoffs for person A  and 
                                                 
43 “(between 0 and 12 – proposal/4).” 
44 “1.25 euros (proposal/4).” 
45 “0 and 10.75 (12 – 1.25) euros.” 33 
person B are determined by the proposal of person A and person B's decision, which she 
determined for the particular proposal beforehand. This means, that each decision of 
person B is relevant for the determination of the payoffs. At the end of the experiment, 
we will inform you of your payoff and ask you to answer a short socio-demographic 
questionnaire (your age, sex,...). Then you will receive your payoff privately; no other 
participant can see what you have earned. 
 34 
Appendix: B. Questionnaire46 
Please mark the correct answers for the following questions. They will help you to 
understand the rules of the experiment. Please note that there could be more than one 
correct answer, so that you have to mark in those cases more than one answer. 
Question 1: Suppose person A offers 6 euros. Person B rejects. How much does person B 
earn?        a.  1  euro  b.  3  euros  c.  6  euros47 
Question 2: In the situation described in question (1), from which interval does person B 
choose person A's payoff?       a. 0 to 12 euros        b. 0 to 6 euros        c. 0 to 9 euros48 
Question 3: Suppose person A offers 11 euros. Person B accepts. How much does person A 
earn?              a. 1 euro      b. 5.50 euros  c. 11 euros 
Question 4: Suppose person B receives a proposal of 0 euros and rejects the proposal. 
Which statement is correct?   a. Person B earns 0 euros. b. Person B earns 0.50 euros. 
c. Person B chooses person A's earnings from the interval 0 to 6 euros. d. Person B chooses 
person A's earnings from the interval 0 to 12 euros. 
                                                 
46 This is the translation of the German questionnaire for the high condition. Differences in the low 
condition are marked by footnotes. 
47 “a. 0.50 euro  b. 1.50 euros  c. 6 euros” 
48 “a. 0 to 12 euros  b. 0 to 6 euros  c. 0 to 10.5 euros” 